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I.

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS

In response to Respondents' "facts" setting forth what occurred with respect to the
appraisal process from 2006 through 2008, 1 the correspondence and documentation associated
with what occurred during that time frame speaks for it~elf and is included in the Augmentation
Record on appeal, attached to the Affidavit of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Relief from Judgment and the Affidavit of William Hodges in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Relief from Judgment. 2 (Respondents' Brief at 6). Respondents summarize facts and

1

Two central themes emerge from Respondents' "Statement of Facts:" (1) that it is Villa
Highlands' fault that it is purportedly underinsured in this case; and (2) that Villa Highlands
stalled the appraisal process. However, the record before the Court on appeal establishes Villa
Highlands' response to these themes, Had Respondents followed the terms of the builder's risk
policy in determining if Villa Highlands was underinsured, the parties may not have been
engaged in litigation over the policy. Further, the record adequately sets forth precisely what
occurred during the course of the appraisal process, including the actions of Western Community
in continually inflating the appraisals used to determine underinsurance in this case in an effort
to find that Villa Highlands was underinsured. Respondents' conduct allowed them to avoid
paying Villa Highlands the full amount due to it under the terms of the policy.
2

At the outset of Respondents' "Statement of the Facts," they object to VillaHighlands'
Statement of Facts on the grounds that it "contains information irrelevant to this appeal,
mischaracterizes the record, contains unsupported assertions that are contrary to the record, and
obfuscates the proper chronology of events." (Respondents' Brief at 2). Respondents did not
provide any specific citations or references which show that Villa Highlands has
mischaracterized or obfuscated the record. (Id.) Instead, Respondents argue that, as an example,
"the reasons as to why the Villa Highland building was inadequately insured by the Appellant is
not an issue currently before the Court on appeal." (Id.) Respondents go on to discuss this very
issue and imply that it is in fact Villa Highlands' fault that it was not adequately insured in this
case and they allude to their reasons why they believe this to be true. (Id. at 3-6). In any event,
the reasons as to how Respondents determined that Villa Highlands was underinsured under the
builder's risk policy is particularly pertinent to this appeal. Additionally, how the insurance
policy was procured and how the limit of insurance was determined are also relevant to the
background of this case.
Moreover, it is in fact Western Community that makes unsupported citations to the record. For
example, Respondents describe how they calculated the loss in this case. The loss was
calculated with a spreadsheet and used $7,160,000 as the estimated value of the building on the
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present extensive argument in their "Statement of Facts" which does not necessarily reflect the
actual record in this case. Thus, instead of rebutting every single inaccurate point raised by
Respondents, Villa Highlands will highlight these inaccuracies in responding to Respondents'
arguments below.

II.
A.

REPLY

The Record Clearly Demonstrates that Western Community was Put on Notice of
Villa Highlands' Breach of Contract Claim.
Western Community first argues that there was no breach of contract action against it

because the parties entered into a Stipulation Re: Villa Highlands Appraisal ("Stipulation") on
January 17, 200_8 and that the effect of such "was that there was no longer any dispute between
' the parties as to whether Western Community had paid the claim according to the dictates of the
Policy." (See Respondents' Brief at 20; see also COE 7, Ex. C). Western Community goes on to
argue that this Stipulation confirmed that the $3,127,207 paid by Western Community "fully
satisfied its burden under the Policy," and states that this is reflected in the Second Amended
Complaint. (Respondents' Brief at 20). Respondents also state that Villa Highlands "voluntarily
dismissed" its claim for beach of contract directly with Western Community. (Id) However,
Respondents' arguments defy the record in this case and are neither persuasive nor responsive to
the controlling authority governing .notice pleading in this State.
Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint, which was filed after the parties entered
into the Stipulation, sets forth a short and plain statement for breach of the insurance contract
date of completion. (COE 11, Ex. A). Respondents state that this figure was "presented by Villa
Highlands" and was the amount reflected in the lender's (First Horizon's) March 15, 2005
appraisal. (See Respondents' Brief at 6). However, this figure is no where to be found in the
First Horizon March 15, 2005 appraisal. (See COE 17, Ex. N).
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2

showing that Villa Highlands is entitled to relief. See e.g. Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North
Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2008) (citation omitted) and see
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). The only contract discussed in Count Four is the builder's risk policy at issue in
this case.' (R. Vol. I, pp. 176-177). Paragraph XXVII of Court Four states that:
Based upon Zimney's apparent authority, Western Community
and/or Farm Bureau are bound by his representations concerning
the subject policy andfailing to tender the amount due arises to a
breach of contract.
(R. Vol. I, p. 177) (emphasis added). Paragraph XXVIII goes on to state that "As a direct result
of Western Community's and/or Farm Bureau's breach of contract, Villa Highlands has suffered
substantial damages in excess of$10,000, which amount will be proven at trial." (Id.) (emphasis
added). This language sets forth that Western Community breached the builder's risk policy and
that it was liable, in damages, to Villa Highlands as a direct result of its breach. Additionally, the
language in Count Six and the prayer for relief in the Second Amended Complaint clearly
reveals that Villa Highlands was alleging that Respondents had not satisfied their obligations
under the builder's risk policy. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-179, 181-182).
Moreover, Western Community's Answer to the Second Amended Complaint also
. evidences that Respondents were on notice of Villa Highlands' breach of contract claim. (See R.
Vol I, pp. 170-182). Again, a party's response to a complaint can be sufficient to demonstrate
that said party has been put on notice of a plaintiff's claims. See Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145
Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612 (citing Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,427,
95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004) and Zattiero v. Homedale Sch. Dist. Number 370, 137 Idaho 568, 572, 51
P.3d 382, 386 (2002)). Conveniently, Respondents do not once discuss or mention their Answer
to the Second Amended Complaint anywhere in their appellate brief. (See Respondents' Brief).
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This is because the language in their Answer is telling and persuasively establishes that Western
Community was on notice of a claim for breach of the builder's risk policy in this case;
Respondents filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on January 29, 2008,
thirteen days after their counsel signed the Stipulation. 3 (R. Vol. I, p.· 183 and COE 7, Ex. C). If
Western Community truly believed that the Stipulation resolved the dispute regarding whether
Western Community had properly paid Villa Highlands' claim and confirmed that Western
Community had fully satisfied its burden under the policy, its Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint does not reveal Jhis belief. In fact, Respondents' Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint reveals the exact opposite. Respondents' Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Twelfth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth affirmative defenses all discuss or relate to defenses against
a written breach of contract claim. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 186-188). Further, Respondents' Answer
to the Second Amended Complaint does not even mention the Stipulation, which could have
been pied as a defense, but was not. Moreover, Respondents' summary judgment briefing (filed
in March of 2008) outlines that there remained a dispute over the amount paid to Villa Highlands
and that there was an amount currently being demanded by Villa Highlands under the policy.
(COE 10 at 8). In short, the Stipulation did not resolve all of the issues between Villa Highlands
and Western Community, including the breach of contract claim.
Western Community next sets forth its interpretation of the Second Amended Complaint,
arguing that Court Four is not aimed at a claim based on the builder's risk policy but instead

3

And, again, the district court ruled that Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation was irrelevant for
purposes of interpreting the builder's risk policy in this case. (Tr. April 9, 2008, p. 73, L. 7-15,
pp. 81-83). Thus, to now imply that this Stipulation, as a whole, has some total binding effect in
this case is an inappropriate argument on appeal, because the district court's ruling in this regard
has not been challenged on appeal.

67918-0001/LEGALI 6028583.1
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refers to the "alleged contract formed by Zimney's representations under Count One of the
Second Amended Complaint and not the insurance policy itself." (Respondent's Brief at 21 ).
This argument is simply not genuine. Count One for breach of contract was asserted against
Dale Zimney whereby Villa Highlands alleged that Daie Zimney breached an oral contract to
procure full and complete insurance coverage for Villa Highlands. (R. Vol. I, pp. 173-174 and
COE 16 at 9sl3). Clearly, Western Community was aware that the contract at issue in Count
Four was the builder's risk policy, and not the contract alleged in Count One. (See R. Vol. I, pp.
185).
Paragraphs VI through XII of the Second Amended Complaint set forth Count One for
breach of contract against Dale Zimney. (R. Vol. I, pp. 173-174). In Western Community's
Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Respondents specifically stated that "the allegations
contained in Paragraphs 6 through 21 are not directed to either Defendant Western Community
or Farm Bureau, these answering Defendants are not required to answer such allegations and, on
that basis, deny the same." (R. Vol. I, p. 185, ,r V). This language alone directly contradicts the
position argued in Respondents' Brief in this matter and their crafted interpretation of the Second
Amended Complaint.
Western Community next argues that its summary judgment briefing reflected its
understanding that Count Four did not address a direct breach of contract claim on the insurance
policy, but was one for vicarious liability. (Respondents' Brief at 22). Although it is true that
Western Community argued that it should not be held vicariously liable for a breach of contract
claim, its argument was primarily focused on the position that Villa Highlands' claims were not
properly for breach of contract, but for negligence against Dale Zimney. (See COE 10 at 15).
However, when Villa Highlands responded to Respondents' motion for summary judgment, it
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asserted that Respondents were liable for their own breaches of the builder's risk policy. (COE
15 at 25). Respondents did not respond to Villa Highlands' assertion. (See COE 26). Further
still, regardless of what Western Community may have argued _in its summary judgment brief,
Respondents cannot ignore what was asserted in their Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint, which clearly denotes that they were on notice of a claim for breach of the insurance
contract in this case.
Respondents also argue that "from the time Villa Highlands executed the Stipulation at
issue until the time of Perkins Coie's involvement in this case, Villa Highlands never undertook
any efforts to procure discovery regarding a direct breach of contract claim against Western
Community or otherwise prepare such claim for trial." (Respondents' Brief at 24). Respondents
fail to cite any basis for this statement and no such basis exists in the appellate record.
Curiously, Respondents subsequently acknowledge that the contrary was, in fact, true. At page
41 of their brief, Respondents reply to Villa Highlands' arguments regarding the district court's
denial of Villa Highlands' motion to compel Western Community's underwriting file information
via 30(b)(6) depositions. Clearly, discovery related to underwriting file information is directed
to how an insurance carrier analyzes and rates an insured's property, including valuation of the
property at the time the policy was written. Respondents' suggestion that Villa Highlands did not
pursue any discovery related to a breach of contract claim is patently false. Unfortunately, the
district court prevented Villa Highlands from obtaining this information.
The language of the Second Amended Complaint and Respondents' Answer to the
Second Amended Complaint establish that Respondents were on notice of a claim for breach of
the builder's risk policy in this case. The language in these pleadings also demonstrate that Villa
Highlands did not somehow "voluntarily dismiss" or "abandon" its breach of contract claim.

67918-000 I/LEGALi 6028583.1
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(See Respondents' Brief at 20, 23, 24, 25). Respondents fail to cite any authority in support of
their references that Villa Highlands dismissed or abandoned its breach of contract claim and do
not even respond to or cite any authority addressing notice pleading in this State. Instead,
Respondents present various arguments aimed at distracting the Court from the controlling
authority in this case and the language of the relevant pleadings at issue. The district court erred
in ruling that Court Four did not state a cause of action for breach of the insurance policy in this
case and its decision should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on this issue.

B.

Count Six was not Moot, the District Court did not Fully Adjudicated Count Six,
and the Issues Raised at Trial had no Impact on Villa Highlands' Ability to Fully
Adjudicate this Claim.
Respondents argue that Count Six of Villa Highlands' Second Amended Complaint for

. declaratory judgment was rendered moot after the summary judgment motions were decided in
this case. (Respondents' Brief at 26). Respondents go on to argue, essentially, that the district
court made comments that Villa H_ighlands' declaratory judgment claim would be concluded
once the appraisal process was completed and that this was somehow binding on Villa
Highlands. (See Respondents' Brief at 27). Villa Highlands is unable to find support for any of
the citations to the record noted on page 27 of Respondents' brief. 4 However, in any event, even
if the district court made casual comments about its understanding of the conclusion of Villa
Highlands' declaratory judgment claim, it made numerous other comments that reflected that: (1)
Villa Highlands' claim was not fully determined; (2) that Count Six would be tried to the Court
and not the jury; and (3) that Count Six would be determined only after the appraisal process
took place in this case. (See R. Vol. II, p. 282 at ,r 4; see Tr. April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13-25, p.
4
.

It appears that perhaps Respondents are working from a different set of Reporter's transcripts
than Villa Highlands on appeal as the page numbers cited by Respondents do not match the page
numbers for the respective transcripts that Villa Highlands is using on appeal.
67918-0001/LEGAL16028583.l
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62, L. 1-6; Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 238, L. 13-25, p. 239, L. 1-2; Tr. April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13251; R. Vol. II, p. 282, ,r 4).
Again in this case, the district court entered an order stating that Count Six was "To be
determined" after the appraisals were completed. (R. Vol. II, p. 282 at ,r 4). Thereafter, the
parties and the district court discussed that Villa Highlands' declaratory judgment claim would be
tried before the court, not the jury, and that this claim had not been fully adjudicated. (See Tr.
April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13-25, p. 62, L. 1-6; Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 238, L. 13-25, p. 239, L. 1-2;
R. Vol. II, p. 282, ,r 4). Villa Highlands believed that its. declaratory judgment claim would be
further adjudicated before the district court after the jury trial concluded, and the record supports
this understanding.
Respondents next argue that Villa Highlands stipulated to the amount of damages at trial
and asserted that it was not contesting the appraisal proc~ss at trial and thus, Villa Highlands
agreed with the outcome of the appraisal process. However, Respondents' arguments are
misleading. The stipulated amount of damages at trial had nothing to do with any number that
came from the appraisal process. Rather, the damages at trial wete determined by the amount of
Villa Highlands' loss, $3,967,157 (which was stipulated to per the terms of the Stipulation
entered on January 17, 2008), minus the amount that Villa Highlands had been paid to date by
Western Community,$ 3,127,207. (See Tr. May 5, 2008, p. 10, L. 9-25, p. 11, L. 1-15; see also
COE 7, Ex.Band C, p. 2 ,r 2; and Aug. R. Order on Defendant Western Community's First
Motion in Limine at 2-3, ,r 5). The appraisal clause language in the builder's risk policy
contemplates that if there is a disagreement regarding either the value of the property or the
· amount of the loss, a written demand may be made for an appraisal of the loss. (COE 6, Ex. A.
at 4 of 7, ,r E.2.) (COE 6, Ex. A). Thus, two calculations are contemplated: the amount of the
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loss and the value of the building. The calculation of the loss was conducted by Western
Community and there was no dispute concerning that.figure. (See COE 7, Ex. C and COE 11,
Ex. A). The value of the loss had nothing to do with the value of the building on the date of
completion or the appraisal process in this case. The value of the building upon the date of
completion, however, remained hotly contested and was attempted to be determined through the
appraisal process. Thus, it is simply misleading and inaccurate to state that the damages sought
at trial had anything to do with the value of the building upon the date of completion that
emerged from the appraisal process.
Moreover, Villa Highlands was prohibited from offering evidence, argument or inference
~egarding the appraisal process at trial, other than referencing that it occurred. (Aug. R. Order on
Defendant Western Community's First Motion in Limine at 2-3, ,r 3). The district court entered
an order on the first day of trial that stated:
... Plaintiff may not offer any reference or inference to Western
Community's adjustment of the loss which tends to cast the manner
in which Western Community did anything improper in the
investigation or adjustment of the loss. Further, since the
adjustment process is ongoing due to the parties' current
participation in the appraisal process, Plaintiff may not offer
evidence, argument, or inference regarding the appraisal process,
other than it occurred. Plaintiffalso may not offer evidence or
infer that Western Community took an inconsistent position during
the adjustment process, incorrectly determined the value of the
building upon the date ofcompletion by utilizing fair market value
or otherwise delayed or improperly paid Plaintiff's claim.
(Aug. R. Order on Defendant Western Community's First Motion in Limine at 3, ,r 3) (emphasis
added). In light of the language of this Order, it is perplexing why Respondents continue to
argue that the trial somehow dealt with the appraisal process, since Villa Highlands was
prohibited from making any reference to the process, other than stating that "it occurred." The
purpose of the appraisal process was not to determine Villa Highlands' damages at trial, but to
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determine Western Community's liability under the policy, which Villa Highlands was precluded
from pursuing in light of the district court's prior rulings in this case. Similarly, there was no
need for Villa Highlands to challenge the appraisal process during the trial since: (1) the
appraisal process was not at issue in the trial; and (2) Count Six was still pending and claim was
to be determined by the district court, not the jury. 5
Respondents also criticize Villa Highlands for stating that it was not contesting the
appraisal process for purposes of the trial. (Respondents' Brief at 32). However, as set forth in
the record, Villa Highlands did inform the district court that it reserved its right to contest the
appraisal process on appeal. (Tr. May 5, 2008, p. 7, L. 7-12). This statement was made because
the appraisal process was not at issue at trial and Count Six was still pending. In addition, given
the district court's pre-trial rulings, Villa Highlands had already made its intentions known that
regardless of the outcome of the trial, this case would be appealed and Villa Highlands ensured
that no argument could be made that it in anyway waived its right to challenge the appraisal
process at a later point in time. (See Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 193, L. 10-17). Further, Villa
Highlands' statement in this regard did not bar its ability to pursue its declaratory judgment claim
after the trial but before any appeal.
Respondents finally assert a half-hearted argument that Villa Highlands is attempting to
raise an issue on appeal that was "never raised before the trial court" with respect to the appraisal
process and criticize Villa Highlands for not confronting the appraisal process prior to the close
of trial. (Respondents' Brief at 31 and 33). These arguments are entirely unfounded. Villa
5

Villa Highlands would also once again note that the Judgment dismissing Count Six was
submitted to the district court just days following the jury trial in this case, was signed, over
Villa Highlands' objection, nine days after the jury trial concluded in this case, and was filed
fourteen days after the jury trial. (R. Vol II, pp. 288 and 296-298). Thus, any criticisms of Villa
Highlands for failing to adjudicate Count Six within this two week period are not reasonable.
67918-000I/LEGALl6028583.l
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Highlands raised, briefed, and argued the district court's dismissal of Count Six and the merits of
the appraisal process in its Motion for Relief from Judgment, to which Western Community
responded. (See Aug. R.). Respondents cite no authority which stands for the proposition that
only motions or claims raised before the close of trial can be raised on appeal. If this were the
law in the State of Idaho, then no litigant could ever appeal an order on a motion for relief from
judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or any other post-trial order or ruling.

1.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Count Six by Siguing the Judgment
in Favor of Western Community and Erred in Denying Villa Highlands'
Motion for Relief from Judgment.

For purposes of brevity, Villa Highlands incorporates herein its arguments made on pages
24 through 36 of Appellant's Opening Brief, which were in large part not responded to by
Respondents. In summary, the district court had no discretion to dismiss Count Six when it
signed the Judgment in favor of Respondents because no applicable motion, proceeding, or
stipulation was before the court to dismiss this claim. (See I.R.C.P. 12, 41, 56). In addition,
there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying Villa Highlands' Motion for Relief
from Judgment and justiciable controversies remained with respect to Villa Highlands' claim for
declaratory judgment that had not been fully adjudicated. See Harris v. Cassia County, 106
Idaho 513,516,684 P.2d 988,991 (1984). For these reasons, the district court erred in
dismissing Villa Highlands' claim for declaratory judgment in Count Six and the district court's
decision should be reversed.
Respondents also essentially argue that Villa Highlands is not entitled to challenge the
appraisal process pursuant to the terms of the policy and further assert that because Villa
Highlands did not attack the appraisal process prior to the close of trial, it was forever precluded
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from challenging the appraisal process. 6 (See e.g. Respondents' Brief at 34-35). However,
Respondents cite to no authority that supports these arguments. The appraisal process was to be
determined after the appraisals took place in this case, which occurred the night before trial, and
the appraisal process was to be determined by the district court, not the jury. Count Six was still
pending after the jury trial concluded and Villa Highlands should have been permitted to fully
adjudicate its claim for declaratory judgment.
Moreover, notwithstanding the use of the word "binding" in the appraisal clause of the
builder's risk policy, courts in other jurisdictions have held that determinations.made pursuant to
these types of clauses are still reviewable and can be set aside. See Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 466 N.W.2d 257,260 (Iowa 1991) and Wells v. American States
Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W.2d 679,683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) and Quinn v. New York Fire Ins.
Co., 126 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Wis. 1964). For the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening
Brief, the district court should have set the "umpire's" determination .aside and should have
granted Villa Highlands' Motion for Relief from Judgment. The district court's refusal to do so
was in error and its decision should be reversed.

C.

The District Court Violated Rule ll(b)(3) and the Circumstances Surrounding
Davison Copple's Withdrawal Warranted Vacating the Trial.
Respondents argue that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Villa

Highlands' motions to vacate the trial because, had they been granted, prejudice would have

6

Respondents also argue, essentially, that Villa Highlands put all of its "apples" in one basket
by asserting only a negligence claim against Dale Zimney at trial, lost at trial, and is now
attempting to revise its litigation strategy through this appeal. (See Respondents' Brief at 36).
This comment is misleadingly convenient. Villa Highlands was precluded by the district c01.~rt's
pre-trial rulings from pursuing any direct claims against Respondents at trial, which was not
Villa Highlands choice or "strategy." Had the district court not dismissed Count Four of the
Second Amended Complaint, this claim would have been tried before the jury in this case.
67918-0001/LEOALI6028583. l
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resulted to Respondents. 7 (Respondents' Brief at 39). Respondents also argue that Villa
· Highlands was really aimed at "re-start[ing]" the litigation which should not have been
permitted. (Id.) Respondents' arguments are once again non-responsive to the controlling
authority on this issue.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b)(3) states in relevant part:
Rule 11 (b)(3). Leave to withdraw - Notice to client.
If an attorney is granted leave to withdraw, the court shall enter an
order permitting the attorney to withdraw and directing the
attorney's client to appoint another attorney to appear, or to appear
in person by filing a written notice with the court stating how the
client will proceed without an attorney, within 20 days from the
date of service or mailing of the order to the client. After the order
is entered, the withdrawing attorney shall forthwith, with due
diligence, serve copies of the same upon the client and all other
parties to the action and shall file proof of service with the court.
The withdrawing attorney may make such service upon the client
by personal service or by certified mail to the last known address
most likely to give notice to the client, which service shall be
complete upon mailing. Upon the entry ofan order granting leave
to an attorney to withdraw from an action, no further proceedings
can be had in that action which will affect the rights of the party of
the withdrawing attorney for a period of 20 days after service or
mailing ofthe order of withdrawal to the party.
I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(3). The motion for leave to withdraw as counsel was granted on March 12, 2008
and Villa Highlands was given 20 days from March 13, 2008 to obtain new counsel. (R. Vol. II,
pp. 224-225). Over the next 20 days, the district court did not toll the deadlines for Villa
7

Respondents argue that this prejudice was expressed through the district court's comment on
March 12, 2008 that if it reset the trial it would be in one year, which was not fair to defendants.
(Respondents' Brief at 39 and Tr. March 12, 2008, p. 4, L. 7-12). However, notwithstanding that
fact that an alternate judge could likely have heard the matter sooner, this is not the reason why
the court denied Villa Highlands' motion to vacate the trial. As set forth by the district court on
April 9, 2009, the court found that six weeks was an adequate time to prepare the case for trial
and that the associate on the case from Perkins Coie had previously worked on this case. (Tr.
April 9, 2008, p. 125, L. 14-20). However, again, as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, the
district court violated Rule 1 l(b)(3) and given the timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal at the
state of proceedings that it withdrew, a vacation of the trial date in this matter was justified and
should have been ordered.
67918-0001/LEGALI 6028583.1

13

Highlands' opposition to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, but instead left the
time ticking so that when Perkins Coie entered an appearance in the case on March 21, 2008, it
had three business days to organize, digest, and analyze the entire case and thereafter draft
opposition briefing and affidavits in response to the pending motions. (See COE 14). No
proceedings were permitted to take place in the 20 days fo11owing the service of the order
allowing the withdrawal, and when the district court failed to toll the summary judgment
deadlines it failed to comply with the rules governing withdrawal.
In addition, the circumstances surrounding the timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal
also warranted the district court vacating the trial and extending the deadlines in this case and the
district court's refusal to do so deprived Villa Highlands of a fundamentally fair trial. 8 See e.g.
Lambert v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780, 769 P.2d 1152 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989).
From the time that Davison Copple moved to withdraw until the time that Perkins Coie entered
its appearance on behalf of Villa Highlands, the deadline to disclose rebuttal lay witnesses
passed, Mr. Zimney's expert witness opinions were overdue, the deadline to depose lay witnesses
had passed, the deadline to supplement discovery was days away, two opposition briefs and
opposition affidavits in response to summary judgment motions were due in three business days,
and counsel for Villa Highlands did not have sufficient time to prepare this complex case for
trial. (COE 14, 19). The district court's rulings should thus be reversed.

D.

Villa Highlands' Claim for Consequential Damages is not Moot.
Respondents argue that the district court properly refused to allow Villa Highlands to

present evidence on its consequential damage claim because such information had not been
8

At the very least, counsel for Villa Highlands should have been more careful not to make any
statements that could potentially prejudice Villa Highlands or its case in the eyes of the district
court when the motion for withdrawal was heard. This caution did not appear to have been
exercised.
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timely disclosed. (Respondents' Brief at 40). Villa Highlands has explained the circumstances
surrounding the disclosure of its consequential damages in Appellant's Opening Brief, and
incorporates those arguments herein for purposes of brevity. (See Appellant's Opening Brief at
40-42). Villa Highlands had moved for an extension to supplement its discovery in light of the
timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal and its motion was not decided. Thereafter, Villa
Highlands supplemented its discovery within the time frame that it has asked for an extension
and the district court deemed the information untimely and the timing prejudicial to
Respondents. When Villa Highlands brought the fact that Respondents had previously seen
iterations of the very discovery that was supplemented thus causing no prejudice to Respondents,
its argument was disregarded. The district court should have allowed Villa Highlands the
opportunity to present evidence in support of its consequential damages at trial and its decision
to the contrary was in error. The district court's decision should thus be reversed and remanded.
Respondents also argue that Villa Highlands' claim for consequential damages is moot
because the jury in this case decided that Villa Highlands was not entitled to any damages.
(Respondents' Brief at 40). Villa Highlands' claim for consequential damages is not moot. For
the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, the district court should have allowed Villa
Highlands the opportunity to present its evidence on consequential damages to the jury and erred
when it dismissed Count Four of Villa Highlands' Second Amended Complaint. (See Appellant's
Opening Brief). Accordingly, if this case is remanded, the Court should reverse the district
court's decision and allow Villa Highlands to pursue its claim for consequential damages against
Western Community.
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E.

Villa Highlands Should have been Entitled to Pursue Discovery against
Respondents.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party .... " I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1 )(emphasis). The information sought
need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
Again in this case, the district court refused to allow Villa Highlands to obtain discovery
from Respondents from two different sources. Villa Highlands moved to compel documents
previously disclosed, but not provided, by Respondents and also moved to compel depositions
that it recently scheduled prior to trial. (COE 33). The documents sought by Villa Highlands
concerned, in part, the underwriting process with respect to the builder's risk policy at issue.
(/d.). Villa Highlands also sought to depose the claims adjuster and attorney who handled
aspects of Villa Highlands' claim and the 30(b)(6) representative of Western Community in order
to obtain information related to Respondents' underwriting process and claims adjusting process.
(COE 33). The district court refused to allow this discovery stating that the same was not
"relevant." (Tr. April 16, 2008, pp. 64-95).
Respondents argue that Villa Highlands had a "full opportunity to conduct this discovery"
and failed to pursue it. 9 (See Respondents' Brief at 42). Respondents' argument simply fails to
substantively address the rules and case law governing discovery.
The discovery sought by Villa Highlands was reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence in connection with the claims and defenses asserted in this
9

It is again worth noting that the discovery deadline was not extended in this case, but the
deadline to conduct depositions waS extended. (Tr. April 9, 2008, pp. 127-128). The discovery
deadline fell within the time frame that Davison Copple withdrew from this case. (COE 14, 19).
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case. The underwriting of the policy and the investigation and handling of Villa Highlands'
insurance claim were reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with
respect to its negligence claims and its claim for declaratory judgment, which were still pending
during the trial. Moreover, this information is discoverable as it relates to Count Four, which
was improperly dismissed. The district court failed to apply the standard set forth in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(I) and its refusal to allow this discovery was in error. The district
court's decision denying this motion should thus be reversed and remanded.
DATED: May 7, 2009.

PERKINS COIE LLP
By: -~LA~~==:..=:.=----Richar
RBoar an@perkinscoie.com
Cynthia L. Yee-Wallace, ISB No. 6793
CYee Wallace@perkinscoie.com
Attorneys for Appell;mt
Villa Highlands, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, certify that on May

';J_, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below,
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s):
Robert A. Anderson
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
FAX: 344-5510

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

Attorneys for Western Community Ins. Co.
and Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho
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